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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RANDY M. LANE
PlaintiffAppellant ,
-vs-

Case No. 20888

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARATMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,
DefendantRespondent •

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter "Board")
substantially agreed with the facts as presented by
Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Lane (hereinafter "Lane") as
presented in his brief filed November 26, 1985.

However, the

Board in its brief added, inter alia, specific facts
regarding the employer's alleged policy of requiring an
employee to request identification from every person who
sought to purchase beer at the employer's place of business.
Respondent's Brief at 9.

However, the Board failed to note

that its own decision, dated August 13, 1985, from which Lane
appeals, included a finding of fact that Lane:
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...was under a duty to verify the age of
customets
who desired to purchase
alcoholic beverages and was responsible
to ask for ID as proof of age in all
cases where the purchaser's age is
questionable. (R.0021) (emphasis added).
The Board made a finding of fact in its decision which
supports the facts as stated by Lane.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE BOARD OF
REVIEW'S RELIANCE ON PROPOSED RULE
A-71-07-l:5(A) IS NOT RELEVANT SINCE THE
BOARD OF REVIEW FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT FOR
THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED RULE.
The Board acknowledges that UDES Proposed Rule
A-71-07-1:5(A) "does not have the legal standing or force of
a formally adopted rule".

Respondent's Brief at 20-21.

Instead, the Board attempts to justify the proposed rule as a
"regulatory codification" of this Couit's holding in
Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663
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Respondent's Brief at 18, 20-21.

However, the Board's attempt to characterize the
appropriateness of the proposed rule as a substantive issue
misses the mark.

Simply stated, whether the proposed rule is

characterized as a "regulatory codification of this Court's
Clearfield decision" (Petitioner's Brief at 18), an
"interpretative guideline for deciding cases under the 'just
cause' provision" (Petitioner's Brief at 19), or, an
2

articulation "in regulatory language the substantive
provision of this Court's Clearfield decision" (Petitioner's
Brief at 20), it ignores the fact that the proposed rule was
not adopted pursuant to the procedural requirements of the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
The Board does not, as it cannot, assert that the
proposed rule is not subject to the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.

Clearly the proposed rule is a "rule"

subject to either the earlier or later Act.

Utah Code Ann.

Sec. 63-46-3(4) (1953 & Supp. 1984) and Utah Code Ann. Sec.
63-46a-2(l)(8)(a)and (b) (1953 & Supp. 1985).

The labels of

"regulatory codification", "interpretive guideline" and
"regulatory language" committed to the proposed rule by the
Board leave little doubt that the proposed rule "implements
or interprets" the law and prescribes policy, thereby making
it subject to the procedural requirements of the Act. Id.
Lane submits that this Court must look to whether the
proposed rule was finally adopted in accordance with the
statutory requirements of the applicable Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.

That is, whether the Board complied with the

procedural requirements of the Act.

That issue should not be

clouded by the Board's assertion that its reliance on the

As noted in Appellant's Brief at 7 there are two
potentially pertinent rulemaking acts. Utah Code Ann. Sec.
63-46-1 et. seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984) and Utah Code Ann. Sec.
63-46a-l et. seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985). The Board has not
asserted that it has complied with the procedural
requirements of either Act.
3

proposed rule was reasonable.

This Court's decision in Kehl

v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129f 1134 (Utah 1985) has
already held that the substance of the proposed rule was
"within the limits of reasonableness and rationality".

The

decision did not, however, address the procedural aspect
being asserted by Lane in the instant case. See Appellant's
Brief at 6-13.
At pages 18-19 of its Brief, the Board attempts to
distinguish Bushmann v. Schweiker , 676 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.
1982) by noting that in Bushmann the i ule was stricken
because the rule had not been published for public comment as
required by the rulemaking statute, whereas UDES Proposed
Rule A-71-07-1:5(A) has been so published.

The requirement

that the proposed rule not be applied prior to its final
adoption as required by the Administrative Rulemaking Act is
no less important.

It allows potentially affected persons to

timely structure their affairs to account for new
regulations.

Therefore, Lane submits that Bushmann, and

cases cited therein, are applicable to the instant case.

See

also, City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F.Supp. 503, 515-516
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) and cases cited therein.
Further, the Board asserts that Lane has shown no
prejudice by the application of the proposed rule to his
case.

It cites the dissenting opinion in Bushmann for this

proposition.

The case relied upon by the dissent in Bushmann

discusses the applicability of the doctrine of harmless
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error.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 1979).

In that case the

court held:
Nor can the Agency rest on the doctrine
of harmless error. While that doctrine
has been held applicable to review of
agency actions, and has statutory
sanction in the APA, it is used only
"when a mistake of the administrative
body is one that clearly had no bearing
on the procedure used or the substance of
decision reached." Braniff Airways v.
CAB, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 379 F.2d 453
(1967). Here the Agency's error plainly
affected the procedure used, and we
cannot assume that there was no prejudice
to petitioners. Absence of such
prejudice must be clear for harmless
error to be applicable. See Alabama
Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
533 F.2d 224, 236 (CA5, 1976), cert,
denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55
L.Ed.2d 494 (1978); Unification Church v.
Attorney General for the U.S., 189
U.S.App.D.C. 92, 94-95, 581 F.2d 870,
872-73, cert, denied,
U.S.
, 99
S.Ct. 102, 58 L.Ed.2d 122 (1978);
Haltmier v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (CA2, 1977).
(emphasis added).
Therefore, Lane submits that the procedural defect alone
demands a reversal of the Board's decision denying him
unemployment benefits.

The failure of the Board to comply

with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act jjs the prejudice
to Lane.

Application of a proposed rule without notice that

the rule is final is, in and of itself, prejudice.
Finally, the Board argues that the decision denying
Lane benefits would have been the same under this Court's
decision in Clearfield since the proposed rule "merely
5

articulates in regulatory language" the Clearfield decision.
Respondent's Brief at 20.

Suffice it to say that the

Clearfield case did not consider the present statute which
contains the "good cause" requirement.

The case of Kehl v.

Board of Review, Supra, in which this Court first interpreted
the "just cause" provision of the statute, did not cite
Clearfield.

Thus, it cannot be said that the outcome under

the proposed rule would have been the same had the Board
applied the Clearfield rationale to the facts of the instant
case .
POINT II
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DECISION IS
UNREASONABLE, IRRATIONAL AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHETHER
CONSIDERED UNDER THE STANDARD OF PROPOSED
RULE A-71-07-l:5(A) OR NOT
The Board, in its brief at pages 9, 23 and 31,
argues that the employer's policy regarding which customers
were to be asked for identification prior to being allowed to
purchase beer was that every person who sought the beer
purchase must be asked for identification.

It cites, at

pages 9 and 23 of its Brief, the testimony of the employer's
Vice President of Operations, Mr. Tassainer, as an
explanation of the employer's policy (R.0048) and as a
rejection of Lane's assertion of his understanding of the
policy, i.e. to request identification from any person who
was attempting to purchase beer and whose age was
questionable (R.0071).

However, the Board's assertion is in

6

direct conflict with its own findings of fact in its August
28, 1985, decision. (R.0021).

That decision, in the third

paragraph, unequivocally notes that Lane:
.•.was under a duty to verify the age of
customers who desired to purchase
alcoholic beverages and was responsible
to ask for ID as proof of age in all
cases where the purchaser's age is
questionable. (R.0021)(emphasis added).
Therefore, it was the Board's own factual finding that the
employer's policy was to require an employee to ask for
identification from a customer prior to a beer purchase only
if the purchaser's age was questionable.

The Board cannot

now be heard to argue that the employer's policy was to
require identification from every customer who sought to
purchase beer when its own findings of fact are to the
contrary.

It should also be noted that the Administrative

Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") made the finding that the
employer "did not have any definite policy regarding age
verification." (R.0032).
As noted by the Board at page 16 of its Brief, this
Court has held that "...it is clear that not every cause for
discharge provides a basis to deny eligibility for
unemployment compensation."

Clearfield City v. Department of

Employment Security, 663 P.2d at 441.

Further,

disqualification does not apply where the evidence shows the
discharge was due to inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct,
failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertences or ordinary negligence in isolated
7

instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion.
See Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 586 P.2d 727, 730
(Utah 1977) and cases cited therein; Clearfield City Vo
Department of Employment Security, 663 P.2d, at 444; and,
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a).

Lane submits that

his conduct causing the termination of his employment was of
the type described above.
Lane was not required by any policy of his employer
to ask for identification from every person who sought to
purchase beer.

As found by the Board, he was required to

request identification only from those persons whose age was
questionable. (R.0021).

The record is replete with facts

substantiating the reason why Lane did not request
identification from the minor who purchased the beer.

In

response to the ALJ's inquiry as to the reason Lane did not
request identification from the minor, Lane stated:
This person looked over 21. He was
wearing old clothes, he had a beard, he
had a slouched hat and he looked over 21
to me and that is why I did not check his
ID on this night. (R.0057).
Both Lane and his wife further testified as to the
circumstances surrounding the sale of the beer to the minor.
They testified that:
Mrs. Lane:

At the time the station was
packed. I mean fully
packed. We had a bus load
of kids. . .

8

Mr, Lane:

Yes. The statement was
there was nobody in the
station and that was
incorrect.

Mrs. Lane:

...but there was.

Mr. Lane:

There was people in the
station. (R.0057).

These facts do not show callous conductf misbehavior or gross
negligence.

Nor do they show fatuous excuses.

Rather, they

establish an explanation for an isolated incident of poorjudgment; a good faith error in discretion.

The Board did

not dispute in its August 13, 1985, decision the ALJ's
holding that Lane "had committed an error in judgment."
(R.0032).
The Board would have this Court believe that Lane's
conviction for selling beer to a minor is alone sufficient to
justify a denial of unemployment benefits.
Brief at 26.

Respondent's

However, the sole issue is whether Lane was

discharged for "just cause" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.
35-4-5(b)(1).

Lane's guilt or innocence of the violation is

not conclusive of his ineligibility for benefits.

There is

no requirement that there be a lack of criminal "guilt" or
"mens tea" to establish eligibility for unemployment
compensation.

This is especially true in the instant case

where the statute violated is one which is malum prohibitum.
Furthermore, the Board submits that if Lane thought
the charge against him was improper "he should have pled not
guilty to the charge and fought to establish his innocence."
9

Respondent's Brief at 26.

However, the record is clear that

Lane would have preferred to do just that but, he was unable
to stay in Parowan long enough after his employment
termination to contest the matter. (R.0046 & 0058).
It is further submitted by the Board that the
discharge of Lane was necessary to avoid actual or potential
harm to the employer's rightful interest.
at 29.

Respondent's Brief

The Board has made no showing of actual harm to the

employer.

Rather, it asserts that the termination was

necessary to avoid potential harm and relies on Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 32-8-53 (1953 & Supp. 1984) f of the Utah Liquor
Control Act for that proposition.

Respondent's Brief at 29.

However, that section jeopardizes the employer's business
license only if the employer acts with "knowledge, consent,
connivance or acquiescence" with the employee's violation of
the Act.

Lane agrees with the Board's assertion that it is

imperative for an employer to have and enforce stringent
policies against violations of the Utah Liquor Control Act.
However, in this case there were no such policies that were
ever communicated to Lane.

In response to the ALJ's question

whether he knew that a violation of a company policy that
prohibited the sale of beer to minors would result in
automatic termination, Lane testified:
No sir, I did not. No. I was told that
there, that numerous people at the
company had received warnings before they
were fired...(R. 0054)
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The only showing that the policy was ever communicated to
Lane is revealed in the following noncommittal response by
the employer's representative:
Judge:

And could you attest that
Mr. Lane was advised when
he was hired or subsequent
to his hire date that he
was advised of that
policy?

Mr. Tassainer: I can attest to the fact
that Mr. Okay had advised
the manager there and the
employees there of
violations that had
occurred previously.
(R.0050)
While it is true that the employer must diligently
ensure that liquor laws are being complied withf it must also
ensure that it establishes policies and that employees are
aware of those policies.

While in the instant case the

employer may feel justified in terminating Lane it does not
necessarily follow that the termination also results in a
finding of "just cause" and an accompanying denial of
benefits.

Indeed, as provided by Proposed Rule

A71-07-l:5(A)(3)(a):
If the conduct was an isolated incident
of poor judgment and there is no
expectation that the conduct will be
continued or repeated, potential harm may
not be shown and therefore it is not
necessary to discharge the employee.
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This same requirement is found in Continental Oil Co. v.
Board of Review, 568 P.2d at 730.
The Board cites the Court to Kehl Vo Board of
Review, supra, as controlling authority in the instant case.
Respondent's Brief at 27.

In the Kehl case the employee was

terminated for a violation of the employer's safety rules.
Specifically, the employee failed to follow pioper procedures
for crossing railroad tracks while operating a forklift
transporting rocket motors containing up to 10,000 pounds of
explosives.

The rules were clear and express and the

employee had knowledge of them.

The Court heLd that the

egregious violation of the employer's safety tule met,
...the culpability requirement because
the wrongness of the conduct, when viewed
in the context of the employment and the
potentially devastating effects on the
employer's rights, was severe and because
the discharge was necessary to avoid the
potential harm to the employer's
interests that another violation would
cause.
Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d at 1134.

Lane submits that

the facts in the instant case do not rise to the level of
"wrongness of conduct" that the facts did in Kehl.

Any

potential harm to the employer in this case would not have
devastating and severe effects on the employer's rights.
Indeed, the assertion that the employer could lose its
business license under Sec. 32-8-53 of the Utah Liquor
Control Act could result only through the employer's
12

"knowledge, consent, connivance or acquiescence."

Misconduct

on the part of the employee alone does not subject the
employer to a loss of its business license under Sec.
32-8-53.

The Board has shown no facts which would manifest

"devastating" and "severe" potential harm of the type
contemplated by the Kehl decision.
Finally, the best way the employer could protect
itself if it feared that its conduct could be construed as
acquiescence is to establish a formal policy concerning the
sale of beer and enforce that policy.

That way the employer

could protect itself under both the Liquor Control Act and
the Employment Security Act, while at the same time treating
employees fairly.
CONCLUSION
The Board of Review's application of UDES Proposed
Rule A71-01-1:5(A) is invalid and unenforceable because it
was not adopted pursuant to the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act and, therefore, its decision
should be reversed.

The error is not harmless since the

mistake had a direct bearing on the procedure used.

However,

even assuming arguendo that the Court can reach the merits,
the Board of Review's decision is unreasonable, irrational
and not supported by substantial evidence, whether the
proposed rule is applied or not.

For these reasons Lane

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board of
Review's decision and enter an order that he is entitled, as
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a matter of law, to unemployment compensation benefits from
April 14, 1985, until he is no longer otherwise eligible,
DATED this Z 3 ^ f a y of January, 1986,

Respectfully submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVECES, INC.

CURTIS K. CHILI
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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